The Expert and the Rules of Evidence

Introduction
The term "forensic science" implies the use of a scientifically based discipline as it intersects with and provides evidence for legal proceedings. The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) set out the framework within which evidence is admitted into court. The primary rules that apply to expert witnesses are FRE 702, Testimony by Experts; and FRE 703, How these rules affect examiners of friction ridge impressions will be discussed later. At this point, the discussion is limited to defining the terms the law of evidence uses in connection with legal proceedings.
Federal Rules of Evidence -Rule 702
The definition and uses of expert testimony, which are also applicable to persons performing forensic friction ridge impression examinations, are expressed in FRE 702. Currently, the rule provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. (As amended Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000.) (FRE, 2004, p 13) The rule encompasses a number of issues. In the order of their mention in the rule, each will be discussed, first in a general sense, and then as they apply to the expert in friction ridge impression examinations. The key purpose of Rule 702 is to determine whether a witness warrants expert status and will be permitted to offer opinion testimony.
Qualifications of the Expert Witness.
A witness who will be offering opinion testimony must first be shown to be qualified as an expert. That step involves the expert taking the stand, being sworn to tell the truth, and providing answers to questions posed by an attorney relating to the witness's competence. At the conclusion of direct testimony, the counsel proffering the witness will ordinarily move that the witness be recognized by the court as an expert. Opposing counsel is given an opportunity to question the witness to challenge his or her expert qualifications. At the conclusion of this process, the judge decides whether the witness may offer opinion testimony as an expert. In deciding, the judge may limit the extent to which the expert will be permitted to testify. The jury has no role in this preliminary step; the determination whether a proffered witness qualifies as an expert is a legal decision. (The process is sometimes referred to as the voir dire of an expert.)
Testimony about the Facts of a Case. It is only
after the preliminary stage of qualifying the witness as an expert is completed that the witness can offer opinions about the case in which the witness was called to court. In a jury trial, the jurors act as the arbiters of the facts. When facts are in dispute, the jurors decide what they believe happened. When the experts testify, the jurors ultimately decide also whether they will accept the opinions expressed by the experts as true facts. Before the jury deliberates, the judge will instruct them that they are free to either believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness, including an expert. The credibility instruction on lay and expert witnesses shows how important it is for the expert to offer concise, credible, understandable, and convincing testimony.
that the same criteria used in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993 , to determine whether testimony offered as scientific knowledge is reliable should also govern the admissibility of testimony under the "technical" and "other specialized knowledge" prongs of Rule 702 to the extent these criteria may be applicable to them. (Daubert and Kumho Tire are discussed more in depth in sections 13.3.1.3 and 13.3.1.4.) Therefore, distinguishing between science, applied science, technology, or experience-based expertise is not paramount or even required. (These two important cases will be revisited later in a discussion of challenges to the admissibility of fingerprint evidence.)
Though the "science versus experience" issue may not be important under Rule 702, it is nevertheless an intriguing question that warrants further discussion. If one postulates that the discipline of forensic friction ridge impression examination represents "science" , then Daubert requires a showing of the scientific underpinnings that make the discipline reliable. Is forensic friction ridge impression examination a scientific endeavor such as, for instance, chemistry or biology? Or is it more of an applied technical field based in several sciences?
The Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology (SWGFAST), a recognized body charged with formulating guidelines for the friction ridge impression examiners' discipline, posits that forensic friction ridge impression examination "is an applied science based upon the foundation of biological uniqueness, permanence, and empirical validation through observation" (SWGFAST, Press Kit) . This is logical when one understands that the fundamental premises on which friction ridge impression "individualizations" (identifications) rest are (1) friction ridge uniqueness and (2) persistence of the friction ridge arrangements. Without an understanding of the biological aspects underlying the formation of friction ridges prenatally, experts would never be justified in reaching a conclusion, reliable or otherwise, that an individualization has been effected (i.e., a positive identification of one individual who was the source of an impression to the exclusion of all other possible persons). The SWGFAST position thus supports the claim that forensic friction ridge impression examination is scientific.
But is it possible that forensic friction ridge impression examination is also technical? Furthermore, does it also require specialized knowledge and training on the part of the expert? Any expert trained to competency in forensic friction ridge impression examinations will certainly admit that, in addition to its scientific underpinnings, the task at hand also requires specialized technical knowledge if one is to achieve a reliable conclusion. Therefore, forensic friction ridge impression examinations can be proffered as any or all three of the prongs contained in FRE 702.
Whom Must the Expert Convince?
The next phrase in FRE 702 indicates whom the expert, through testimony, is expected to assist: it is the "fact finder" .
Because the Federal Rules of Evidence, and therefore FRE 702 as well, apply whether the expert testifies at a pretrial hearing or at the trial itself, the expert must understand that at a pretrial admissibility hearing based on a Daubert challenge, the judge also acts as the fact finder. The expert testimony at such a hearing is provided solely to assist the judge in determining whether the Daubert challenge will be sustained or rejected.
The expert testimony given at trial, by contrast, is initially directed to the judge for the determination of whether the witness qualifies as an expert and, once found to be qualified, then to the jury, if any, for the purpose of presenting the results, conclusions, and expert opinions obtained during the examination process. In a nonjury (bench) trial, the judge will also act as the fact finder.
Testifying about Qualifications. The next phrase
in FRE 702 states, "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise" . This phrase describes how courts are to determine whether one is an expert as proffered. The expert needs to be prepared to identify specific information for each of the five criteria listed in the rule: knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education. A well-prepared expert should have the pertinent details for these criteria set out in a curriculum vitae.
The direct testimony on the qualifications typically includes a recital of the person's education (formal and otherwise); specialized training received, including detailed information of the nature, length, and detail of that training; the professional certifications obtained; continuing education pursued; membership and activities in professional societies; awards received; written materials prepared and courses taught; and previous expert testimony offered.
Persons seeking to qualify as expert witnesses need to continually update their curriculum vitae so that lawyers seeking to present their testimony will have an accurate copy available for the court. A well-written, professional 13-5 Fingerprints and the Law C H A P T E R 1 3 curriculum vitae goes a long way to shorten what can otherwise be a lengthy qualification process and possibly avert some cross-examination questions by opposing counsel regarding the expert's qualifications. An impressive curriculum vitae may actually result in the defense offering to stipulate to the expert's qualifications. Under this scenario, the opposing counsel makes a conscious strategic decision to stipulate so that the judge and jury will not be overly influenced by impressive credentials. There are other reasons the defense may stipulate to the expert's qualification (e.g., a simple desire to save time; no intent to aggressively contest the expert's testimony in an effort to downplay its significance; or, when the fingerprint identification is uncontested, as in a self-defense or insanity defense case).
Is Expert Opinion Testimony Warranted?
The ultimate question on whether expert testimony is warranted at all in a particular case requires the judge to determine, from a common sense perspective, whether an untrained lay person (judge or juror) presented with factual evidence can determine what happened alone, without an expert's assistance. If so, then expert opinion testimony is not warranted. But if the expert's opinion would be helpful to the fact finder in understanding the significance of factual data, then the expert witness is essential and opinion evidence is admissible.
Further Requirements of Revised FRE 702.
Once the judge determines that an expert is qualified to give opinion evidence under FRE 702, then the expert can so testify. In April 2000 (effective December 2000), the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended to include three further requirements which must also be met. They are "(1) the testimony (must be) based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case" . These three requirements were added by the FRE committee to conform opinion testimony to the mandates of the Daubert and Kumho Tire decisions. The revision makes it easier to present effective scientific and technical expert testimony whenever such evidence is warranted and also provides a basis for excluding opinion testimony that cannot be said to be based on a reliable methodology.
The first one of these three requirements necessitates that the expert's testimony rest on a sufficient basis that supports a reliable conclusion. Under ideal conditions, known facts or data would present themselves with clearcut answers and would be totally based upon objective measurements. The reality is that this rarely occurs. In fact, it is in the nature of science that some premises remain in a gray area where a degree of subjectivity is unavoidable.
How many data and facts are needed to allow the judge to find a "sufficient" basis for the opinion? That question is still being debated among legal scholars.
What does the forensic science of friction ridge impression examinations offer to the court on that same issue of sufficiency? It has been established by sound and repeated studies that friction ridge examination evidence permits the uncontroverted association of a particular individual with a particular scene or object. If the scene or object is part of a crime, the individualization evidence would certainly offer a logical connection to a case, permitting a jury to draw conclusions as to guilt or innocence of the individualized person.
The second requirement asks whether the testimony will be the product of reliable principles and methods. Here, the expert must not only be able to state the principles and the methods used but be familiar with any research or testing that has demonstrated the reliability. In this regard, friction ridge examination follows an established SWGFASTapproved methodology designed to lead to reliable and verifiable conclusions if the prescribed methodology is followed by a competent examiner.
The third requirement mandates that the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Here the court must determine whether everything the witness testified to previously in connection with the first and second requirements was adhered to in the particular case. It would be a blunder of monumental proportions for an expert to lay out the details of the specific process in satisfying the first and second requirements and then completely abandon that process for the case at hand.
It must be recognized, however, that occasionally exceptions to the use of recommended processes are warranted, indeed required, by the particular circumstances of a case. Methodologies and examination protocols are designed to deal with the normal course of an investigation to the extent that a "normal" course can be anticipated.
The nature of criminal activity occasionally does not always follow anticipated paths. Deviating from recommended "standard" processes requires a lot of thought and experience on the part of an examiner, but the justification for the deviation must always be clearly documented in the examiner's notes.
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Federal Rules of Evidence -Rule 703
FRE 703, the basis of opinion testimony by experts, states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by the experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inference upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
This rule describes the different types of testimony experts can offer.
Testimony about First-Hand Knowledge; The
Hypothetical Question. An expert, like any ordinary fact witness, may testify to observations the expert made in examining evidence, the methods used and factual data found, and then express an opinion derived from such first-hand knowledge possessed by the expert. That is one of the traditional forms of expert testimony. But in addition, the first sentence of FRE 703 also permits an expert to offer opinions on facts of which the expert may not have known prior to coming to court, but of which the expert was apprised at the hearing or trial. That is what is known as the typical "hypothetical question" wherein an expert is asked to assume a series of facts stated by the direct examiner (or cross-examiner) and, after these facts have been stated, the expert is asked whether he or she has an opinion based on these facts. These two forms of expert evidence have long been sanctioned by the common law of evidence.
Testimony Based on Reports or Examinations
Made by Others. The second sentence of Rule 703 represents a change from what previously was the law. It is a change that even today is not followed in all jurisdictions.
Normally, if an expert has arrived at an opinion based on facts that the expert was told by someone else, the basis for that opinion is "hearsay" , and, at one time, such an opinion was inadmissible in most state and federal jurisdictions.
When the Federal Rules of Evidence were written, the drafters decided to do away with this long-standing prohibition and to permit opinion testimony based on hearsay, provided the hearsay is of the kind that experts in the particular field rely on to make ordinary professional decisions in their careers. Under this portion of the rule, for instance, doctors are now permitted to testify to X-ray reports received from an X-ray technician or information contained in nurses' reports without first having to call the X-ray technician or nurse to court. In or out of hospitals, doctors do rely on such reports to make life and death decisions, and the drafters of the FRE decided to focus on the reliability of such evidence as determined by the practitioners in the field rather than as determined simply by technical rules such as the common law prohibition against the use of hearsay evidence. Thus, the FRE significantly broadened the potential scope of expert testimony. FRE 703 now permits professionals to rely upon reports of others without first having to call any of these "others" as witnesses, as long as to do so is a recognized practice in their discipline. In such a case, the expert may testify to the development method used by the investigator even though the expert was not present when the latent print was made visible.
Such inadmissible hearsay may be presented to the jury if, in the judge's estimation, its probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have. 
Federal Rules of Evidence-Rule 701
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The intent of FRE 701 is to provide a contrast for a better understanding of FRE 702. FRE 701 outlines the conditions under which even a nonexpert may testify to an opinion or draw a conclusion from known facts.
Generally speaking, lay (nonexpert) witnesses may offer opinion testimony in those cases where their opinions are (1) rationally based on their perception and (2) when to do so would be helpful to the jury. Thus, nonexpert witnesses may offer the kind of opinions that ordinary persons would make in their daily lives. Lay witnesses who testify can utter opinions like, "he was drunk" , or "he was going way too fast" , or "I could hear everything through the wall and they were having an argument" .
The law prohibits lay persons, however, from offering opinions on the ultimate issue to be determined. For example, an opinion that "the defendant was grossly negligent" is not considered to be "helpful" to the jurors in forming their own conclusions (rather, it attempts to draw the conclusion for them) and is therefore not permitted. It may be that all persons witnessing the same occurrence would have come to the same conclusion, and therefore the opinion was rationally based on perception. Nevertheless, the type of opinion by a lay witness that goes to the ultimate Such an instruction will typically be given to the jury after it has been instructed that it is the sole judge of the credibility of all the evidence it has heard and that it may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, in whole or in part, if the jury finds such evidence (or any part of it) to be unconvincing or not worthy of belief. One or more additional instructions on the duty of the jury in weighing evidence may be given.
It is also permissible for the judge to supplement the standard expert witness jury instruction with special provisions more applicable to a particular case. However, in charging the jury, the judge may not refer to the testimony of any particular witness and may not single out certain testimony or evidence. during his or her testimony, especially if a defense expert will also be testifying.
The Expert and Potential Impeachment Information
There are three significant cases that mandate what information the prosecution must provide to the defense.
Two of these cases apply uniformly across the country as a matter of constitutional law; the third was decided by the In Brady v Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that anyone accused of a criminal matter has the right to be informed of any potentially exculpatory information within the prosecutor's control that may be favorable to the accused and may be material to either guilt or punishment.
Materiality of the evidence means that there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed in a proceeding, the result of the proceeding would have been different. If the prosecution is uncertain whether certain materials requested by the defense must be disclosed, it may ask the court to inspect the material in chambers to make that determination.
In effect, if a fingerprint expert knows of any information from an examination of the evidence that could be considered exculpatory to the accused, such information must be provided to the prosecutor and, ultimately, to the court and defense.
In Giglio v United States, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the government is constitutionally required to disclose any evidence favorable to the defense that may impact a defendant's guilt or punishment, including any information that may bear on the credibility of its witnesses, even if the defendant fails to request such information.
In United States v Henthorn, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled that the government has a duty to review the personnel files of its testifying officers and to disclose to the defense any information which may be favorable to the defendant that meets appropriate standards of materiality. Obviously, this is information that would go to the qualifications of the experts. Such matters as past errors, required retraining, or any actions that may reflect on the integrity or credibility of the expert are susceptible to this ruling. Although this is not a U.S. Supreme Court rule, it is being followed widely by other jurisdictions.
Federal Rules of Criminal ProcedureRule 16
The 
Other Federal Rules of Evidence as They Pertain to Fingerprints and Related Expert Testimony
The conclusions reached by the expert performing a forensic latent print examination ordinarily cannot be stated until the evidence has been admitted. Although the responsibility for presenting the expert's testimony in court lies with the prosecuting attorney to ensure that the foundation of the evidence is properly established, the expert witness, in testifying, must stay within the limits of permissible court testimony.
Forensic laboratories should have standard operating procedures along with a quality assurance program that provides for the integrity of the evidence. Such matters as chain of custody and evidence security from the time it is initially received to the time it leaves the laboratory are crucial for ensuring that evidence will be admitted in court.
FRE 401 demands that the evidence be relevant to the case at hand. Although this may seem obvious, its intent is to preclude the introduction of evidence that serves no benefit in determining the ultimate questions in the case.
FRE 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence" .
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In United States v Mitchell (discussed more in depth in section 13.3.2.1), the first Daubert hearing challenging the science of fingerprints, Judge J. Curtis Joyner took judicial notice that friction ridge skin is unique and permanent, even for small areas. This ruling was stated to be in error by the appellate court. Although the uniqueness of full finger patterns of friction skin may be properly noted judicially and the fact is supported by sound biological evidenceindeed, even the defense ordinarily no longer challenges it-the issue in Mitchell was whether small areas of a latent impression were also unique. That fact was found not to be established with certainty because its proof required presentation of conflicting evidence over the better part of a week. Therefore, the uniqueness of incomplete and partially distorted friction ridge impressions is not one that a court could judicially notice. Therefore, it is important that the uniqueness of partial latent prints be thoroughly explained by the expert because it is critical in establishing the rationale for stating that conclusions from even partial A fingerprint expert's case examination documentation is governed by these rules, as well as any photographs of the latent prints, AFIS searches, and known exemplars from an arrest record (see also FRE 902 (4), Self-Authentication,
Certified Copies of Public Records).
The FRE govern most aspects of presenting evidence and getting it successfully admitted. A fingerprint experts' training program should include a discussion of these rules. This knowledge will certainly assist the examiner in having the evidence and the resulting testimony regarding the evidence admitted. The court in Frye suggested how courts contemplating whether to admit novel expert testimony ought to proceed:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently It treated novel scientific evidence the same as any other evidence: evidence was admissible as relevant, under FRE 401, if it had "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence" (FRE, 2004, p 
3).
Thus, the FRE contained no special rule that, when dealing with "scientific" evidence, novel or otherwise, ensured that science-based testimony is reliable and, therefore, admissible. All evidence was admissible if relevant, provided its use 13-12 C H A P T E R 1 3 Fingerprints and the Law in court was not outweighed by undue prejudice, misleading of the jury, or requiring an undue consumption of time.
The FRE also did not distinguish between the admissibility of expert opinion evidence in criminal as opposed to civil cases. They applied the same standard of admissibility except in a few situations that are specifically earmarked or shaped by constitutional principles. [Author's note: As the following discussion of case law appears in a nonlegal document, internal citations for all quotations will not be provided in order to aid readability.] The court expounded on the latitude that trial courts have in deciding how to test an expert's conclusion and to decide whether or when appropriate hearings ought to be conducted to investigate the claims of reliability. The court instructed that a trial judge's inquiry is a flexible one and that the gatekeeping function, of necessity, must be tied to the particular facts of a case. The factors identified in Daubert are not supposed to be talismanic, nor do they constitute a definite checklist or a litmus test. Whatever decision a trial court makes on either the admissibility or inadmissibility of proffered opinion evidence, or indeed on whether the evidence is relevant, will be judged by the standard of "abuse of discretion" .
In making this point, the court was emphasizing that after
Daubert, but before the Kumho Tire decision was handed down, the U.S. Supreme Court had already applied the abuse-of-discretion standard as the test to use when reviewing the decision of a district court to either admit or deny admission of expert testimony. The case was General Electric Co. v Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512 (1997).
(That decision raises the specter that the issue of reliability of a technique might be decided differently in separate district courts, and that, on appeal, both seemingly inconsistent holdings will have to be affirmed if, on the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in arriving at its decision.)
What do the decisions in Daubert and in Kumho Tire mean to forensic scientists beyond the obvious holdings already discussed? There are at least two additional points to be made:
1. It means that the definition of science, the scientific method, and scientific evidence can no longer be used as loosely as experts have been doing. It is no longer sufficient to call yourself a forensic scientist in order to be considered a scientist. It is no longer sufficient to say that something is a subject of forensic science in order for a court to agree that it is dealing with science. Simply saying it does not make it so. The courts may, and many will, require the experts to show that they know what the scientific method consists of and provide the scientific basis for their conclusions. By the same token, each discipline will be judged by its own standards and upon its own experience. The DNA model of expertise, much vaunted for its scientific basis by critics of the forensic sciences, may not be the basis by which other disciplines need or should be judged.
2. It also means that forensic scientists can no longer expect to rely on the fact that courts have long accepted and admitted evidence of their expert conclusions. The court can relitigate the admissibility of a certain type of expert evidence if a litigant can make a credible argument that there has been no previous scientific inquiry of the validity of the assumptions on which a forensic field has long rested. Decades of judicial precedent no longer preclude reviewing whether existing precedent satisfies Daubert and Kumho Tire. Long-recognized forensic disciplines have been and are being challenged, with more to come.
The Daubert Factors and Their Relation to the
Frye Test of "General Acceptance". How Daubert "reliability" is to be established still remains an issue of some controversy. The court explained this requirement in these words:
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested. Scientific omitted.] The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.
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Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential error,. . . 
Daubert Challenges Against "Fingerprints" After 1993
Challenges to the Admissibility of Friction
Ridge Individualizations. The first challenges to forensic evidence were brought against forensic document examiners (FDEs). A few U.S. District Court decisions wherein the admissibility of expert testimony of handwriting identifications was challenged had resulted in partially prohibiting experts from testifying to the ultimate conclusion that a defendant had written, or did not write, a questioned document in issue. In most cases, though, the admissibility challenges were soundly rejected by trial courts and handwriting identification evidence was found to satisfy In its opinion, the court of appeals ignored an issue that had been hotly debated at the Daubert hearing-whether fingerprint identification was a science. Recall that the it unnecessary to draw a distinction between scientific and nonscientific expert testimony, inasmuch as Kumho Tire had held that the gatekeeper role of the trial judge in keeping unreliable opinion evidence out of court applied to all expert opinions, whether deemed scientific, technical, or experience-based.
The appeals court in Mitchell explored each one of the Daubert factors. In doing so, the court's decision, although ultimately favorable to the prosecution, was not overwhelmingly laudatory.
The First Factor -Testability. Testability refers to "whether the premises on which fingerprint identification relies are testable-or, better yet, actually tested" . The court concluded that the premises that friction ridge arrangements are unique and permanent, and that a positive identification can be made from fingerprints containing sufficient quantity and quality of detail, were testable and had been tested in several ways. In that regard, the court referred to the FBI's AFIS computer comparison of 50,000 left-sloped patterns against a database of another 50,000 sets of tenprints, a process involving 2.5 billion comparisons. The experiment showed there were no matches of prints coming from different digits. The court referred to several other tests, such as those involving the prints of identical twins, and the fact that an FBI survey showed no state identification bureaus had ever encountered two different persons with the same fingerprint.
The second part of the testability factor involved the fact that making a positive identification depends on "fingerprints containing sufficient quantity and quality of detail" .
The court was somewhat troubled that the standard of having a point system had been abandoned and that the FBI relied on an "unspecified, subjective, sliding-scale mix of 'quantity and quality of detail'" , but because the FBI expert testifying at the hearing had identified 14 points of level 2 detail when matching Mitchell's right thumbprint to the crime scene latent, the court saw the issue in this case as simply whether having 14 points of level 2 detail was enough for a positive identification. Referring again to the AFIS computer check with simulated latents (exhibiting only 1/5 of the size of a rolled fingerprint) and the survey that showed no identification bureau had ever found two matching prints on different digits, the court found this to be "the strongest support for the government on this point" . It concluded that the "hypotheses that undergird the discipline of fingerprint identification are testable, if only to a lesser extent actually tested by experience" .
The Peer Review Factor. The court did not seem overly impressed by the government's argument that the verification step of ACE-V constitutes effective peer review. Dr.
Simon Cole, testifying for the defense, had suggested that fingerprint examiners have developed an "occupational norm of unanimity" that discourages dissent. Although acknowledging that the "cultural mystique" attached to fingerprinting may infect the verification process, the court nevertheless concluded that when looking at the entire picture, "the ACE-V verification step may not be peer review in its best form, but on balance, the peer review factor does favor admission" of friction ridge comparisons and individualizations.
The Error Rate. This is where the experts on both sides had waged the greatest battle at the Daubert hearing. The appeals court distinguished between two error rates: false positives and false negatives. The defense included and emphasized errors where examiners had failed to make identifications that could and should have been made. In that regard, the court recognized that a high false negative rate may not be desirable as a matter of law enforcement policy, but said that "in the courtroom, the rate of false negatives is immaterial to the Daubert admissibility of latent fingerprint identification offered to prove positive identification because it is not probative of the reliability of the testimony for the purpose for which it is offered (i.e., for its ability to effect a positive identification" (italics in the original).
False positives, on the other hand, would be most troublesome. But the court concluded that, "where what is sought to be proved is essentially a negative (i.e., the absence of false positives) it seems quite appropriate to us to use a burden-shifting framework" . Where the government experts testify to being unaware of significant false positive identifications, the burden of producing contrary evidence may reasonably be shifted to the defense. Although the error rate may not have been precisely quantified, the court was persuaded that the methods of estimating it showed it to be very low. (This testimony occurred before the FBI misidentification of Brandon Mayfield in the Madrid, Spain, train bombing terrorist attack (Stacey, 2004, pp 706-718; OIG report, 2006) .)
The Maintenance of Standards. The Mitchell appeals court found this standard to be "lacking in some measure" .
The procedural standards of ACE-V were deemed to be "insubstantial in comparison to the elaborate and exhaustively refined standards found in many scientific and technical
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As an aside, the question often arises, not surprisingly, whether subjectivity plays a part in the ultimate decision that two impressions were produced by the same skin, and the related question, whether subjectivity negates reliability. In comparing latent impressions of unknown origin with prints of known origin to determine whether a "match" exists, some subjectivity is involved, but the factors that guide the exercise of judgment are clearly spelled out in the detailed observations that are required to be made when going through the first three steps of ACE-V.
The view, often advocated by critics, that fingerprinting is unscientific simply because some subjective judgment is involved in declaring a match, had already been rejected The General Acceptance Factor. Little needs to be said on this factor, which the court found to be clearly weighing in favor of admitting the evidence.
To conclude, the Mitchell appeals court's decision was that, on the record presented to it, an analysis of the Daubert factors showed that "most factors support (or at least do not disfavor) admitting the government's" evidence on friction ridge individualizations. Thus, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. This is by no means a strong endorsement, even though it may be seen as such in the practical effect the opinion will Uniqueness of each fingerprint was not the issue here; the issue was uniqueness of small areas of friction skin such as are typically visible in a latent impression. As to that issue, the appellate court felt that the very fact that it took 5 days of testimony to establish the uniqueness of small areas of friction skin showed that the fact was by no means generally known or capable of ready determination.
Therefore, Judge Joyner's judicial notice ruling was in error.
Because it was not deemed to likely have altered the outcome of the case, it was considered to be harmless error not requiring a reversal. v Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001) . Because the decision is "older" than the previous two cases, and the opinion is readily available on the Internet, it will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that this was the first federal circuit court of appeals case after Daubert that gave an unqualified seal of approval to friction ridge impression evidence. We have gone at length into the subject of palm print and finger print identification, largely for the purpose of evolving the indisputable conclusion that there is but one physiological basis underlying this method of identification; that the phenomenon by which identity is established exists, not 
United States
Commonwealth v
Admissibility of Footprints as Proof of Identity
Admissibility of Photographs of Latent Impressions
Fingerprinting Not a Violation of Constitutional Rights
In a number of early cases, courts held that requiring a law- From an examination of the authorities cited and others, it appears that an allusion to finger print impressions for the purposes of identification is referred to in writings as early as 600 A.D., and they are traced back to a period some 100 years before Christ. Finger prints were first used as a manual seal to give authenticity to documents.
They are found on Assyrian clay tablets of a very early date in the British Museum, and they were also used in the same way by the early Egyptians.
From the literature on the subject and from the reported cases, we learn that finger prints have long been recognized as the strongest kind of circumstantial evidence and the surest form of identification. . . .
We have no doubt but that the finding of the finger prints of the defendant on the door of the vault, with the further proof that defendant did not have access to and had not been at the place burglarized so that the prints could be accounted for on any hypothesis of his innocence, is a circumstance irresistibly pointing to his guilt. . . . By the requirement that the defendant's finger prints be taken there is no danger that the defendant will be required to give false testimony. The witness does not testify. The physical facts speak for themselves; no fears, no hopes, no will of the prisoner to falsify or to exaggerate could produce or create a resemblance of her finger prints or change them in one line, and therefore there is no danger of error being committed or untruth told. Just as science progresses and changes occur over time, so has the legal system.
Fingerprints to Identify Individual as a Habitual Criminal
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